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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Preface 
Albert Einstein once said that "things should be as simple as possible, but no simpler." 
That wise observation applies to the teaching of federal income taxation, among other things. 
ln recent years, the Internal Revenue Code has become ever more complex, as has the 
teaching of the taxation of business enterprises. The practical problem is that the law student 
who plans a career in business law is in an unpleasant predicament. He or she must either 
avoid federal income tax courses, and bear the guilty knowledge that a large area of relevant 
law has been overlooked, with significant implications in terms of personal feelings of 
inadequacy, or face the burden of taking a large dose of notoriously difficult courses in 
corporate and partnership taxation. This book is designed to alleviate that Hobson's choice. 
Whether it has succeeded is for the instructor and student to decide. 
This book provides teaching materials for a basic income taxation course dealing with 
the taxation of partnerships, corporations, S corporations, and limited liability companies. In 
addition, it alludes to a short list of other business enterprises. It can definitely be completed in 
the usual three hours assigned to such courses, on the assumption that students will spend two 
hours of preparation for each hour in the classroom. 
The book begins with the study of partnerships, moves to C corporations, then to S 
corporations, then to limited liability companies. In general, we take a cradle-to-grave 
approach to each subject. Our teaching of the course out of these materials convinces us that 
the order is realistic and effective. 
The cases have been extensively edited, and most footnotes in the original cases have 
been eliminated (and in one case, split) without any explicit reference to the fact of their 
elimination, other than the words in this paragraph. Case and statute citations of the court and 
commentators, as well as footnotes, have been omitted without so specifying; numbered 
footnotes are from the original materials but do not retain the original numbering, except by 
accident. 
The book is fairly rich with problems that are scattered along the way, rather than at 
the end of each chapter. They are not especially difficult and are designed to build confidence 
while at the same time forcing at least some review of the central Code provisions and 
pertinent regulations. We do not view this as a "problems" book, and we advise students that 
if they find themselves struggling unduly. with a problem, to drop it, but always at least take a 
crack at the problems, because if they do not, the colloquy in class in which the answer is 
revealed will pass over their heads. 
Richard A. Westin 
Lexington, Kentucky, 2012 
Richard C.E. Beck 
New York City, New York, 2012 
Sergio Pareja 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, 2012 
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Chapter 1 
THE TAX CHARACTER OF PARTNERSHIPS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. ST A TE LAW CHARACTERISTICS 
A partnership is a contractually-based relationship among owners of an enterprise 
organized for a profit. Partnerships fall into the following two broad categories: general 
partnerships and limited partnerships. 
General partnerships can arise orally and may be informal, although most operate 
under a written partnership agreement, which is to say a foundational contract among its 
owners. By contrast, limited partnerships are creatures of state law that must satisfy filing 
requirements, usually with a Secretary of State, in order to come into being, and that must 
have at least one general partner. 
The defining characteristic of a general partnership is that each partner bears 
unlimited personal liability to third parties for the partnership's obligations. Limited partners, 
on the other hand, like shareholders in a corporation, are liable to third parties only to the 
extent of their actual contributions to the limited partnership, plus any promised additional 
contributions. Again, like shareholders, limited partners as such are generally precluded from 
managing the partnership. Limited partnership interests, like shares of stock, are fairly easy to 
market, whereas it is difficult to market general partnership interests. 
There is one related concept that merits mentioning at this point - the "joint venture." 
This is non-tax terminology for a state law partnership that has a limited purpose, such as to 
build and sell a single apartment project. 
2. TAX BACKGROUND 
The partnership tax rules appear in§§ 701-777 of the Code, known as Subchapter K. 
After careful study, Subchapter K was enacted in 1954 in order to straighten out the confusion 
that had arisen under earlier tax laws. The Senate Finance Committee Report in support of the 
new framework provided: 
"The existing tax treatment of partners and partnerships is among the most 
confused in the entire income tax field. The present statutory provisions are wholly 
inadequate. The published Regulations, rulings, and court decisions are incomplete 
and frequently contradictory. As a result, partners today cannot form, operate or 
dissolve a partnership with any assurance as to tax consequences. 
This confusion is particularly unfortunate in view of the great number of business 
enterprises and ventures carried on in partnership form. It should also be noted that 
the partnership form of organization is much more commonly employed by small 
businesses and in farming operations than the corporate form. 
Because of the vital need for clarification, the House and our committee have 
undertaken the first comprehensive statutory treatment of partners and partnerships in 
the history of the income tax laws. In establishing a broad pattern applicable to 
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partnerships, generally, the principal objectives have been simplicity, flexibility, and 
equity as between partners."1 
Whether these goals have actually been achieved seems doubtful, and Subchapter K 
has a well-deserved reputation for complexity despite the deceptively simple appearance of 
both the Code sections and the reporting forms.2 
Some basic principles may be seen in the forms. Begin by looking at the annual 
partnership return (Form I 065) which appears as an appendix to this book. No tax payment 
accompanies the Form 1065, which is why it is called an information return. However, each 
Form 1065 is accompanied by at least two Forms K-1; this is the form on which a report of the 
individualized results of a partnership's year is made for each particular partner. The 
partnership's tax return preparer transmits a completed K-1 to each partner at the end of the 
partnership's taxable year, and it is used by each partner in preparing his own personal return. 
A Schedule K-1 appears immediately after the Form 1065 as an appendix. 
These forms illustrate a basic tension that runs through Subchapter K, namely that a 
partnership is both an aggregate of individual partners who pay taxes directly on their share of 
the partnership's profits, but at the same time is also a separate entity for a variety of other 
purposes, such as filing the tax return, having a distinct taxable year, and adopting an 
accounting method to compute its profits or losses. The former is referred to as the "aggregate 
theory"; the latter is known as the "entity theory." The tax law in some instances treats a 
partnership as if it were an entity and in others as if it were an aggregation of individuals. 
B. THE GROWING POPULARITY OF PARTNERSHIPS 
The partnership form of doing business (where feasible) is often favored over 
incorporation. In large measure one can attribute this preference to recent changes in federal 
tax law which are relatively disadvantageous to corporations. The Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 inverted the historic relationship between individual and corporate marginal tax rates in 
which top individual income tax rates used to exceed top corporate rates. As a result, the 
corporate form naturally became less desirable than previously. In more recent years, the rate 
differential between the top personal and corporate federal income rates has all but 
disappeared. But rates are not the only reason for preferring non-corporate form. Corporations 
also suffer from the enduring problem of the double tax. 
Because corporations are separate legal and taxable entities, doing business in 
corporate form presents a "double tax" problem, in the sense that the corporation first pays its 
own tax on its profits, and then when it distributes those same profits as dividends, the 
shareholders must pay a second tax on those same profits. By contrast, a partnership itself is 
1 S. Rep. No. 1622 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 89 ( 1954). 
2 Little did the 1954 legislators imagine how deep the conflict between simplicity and flexibility could 
go, and how complicated Subchapter K would turn out to be in practice. The late Professor Boris 
Bittker seems to have thought the effort was a failure. B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates 
and Gifts, Vol. 3 at 85.1.2 (1981). Much of the reason for these complications seems to be the 
exploitation by clever tax advisors of rules designed for simple and straightforward transactions by 
inappropriately applying them to complicated tax-driven transactional formats for which the rules 
were not intended. That in turn triggers reactions by Congress and the Internal Revenue Service that 
are themselves overly complex, if not sometimes paranoid. On a deeper level, however, the 
underlying problems are probably inherent in the structural ambiguities of Subchapter K itself. In the 
end, Subchapter K may simply be inappropriate for businesses of any degree of complexity. 
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not subject to the separate U.S. income tax on corporations; instead, all partnership items of 
income deduction or credit pass through to the partners, and, when a partnership distributes its 
profits, there is no second round of taxes. On the other hand, in recent years the corporate 
double tax has been at least temporarily softened by making most dividends taxable at 
favorable long-term capital gains rates. 
The choice of entity question has never been easy and has always involved complex 
trade-offs. Before 1986, for example, when corporate rates were substantially lower than 
individual rates, it was sometimes desirable to live with the double tax if it could be postponed 
by making no distributions out of the corporation, because investors would have greater after- 
tax capital available within their corporate entity than would remain after taxes from 
comparable profits of a proprietorship or partnership. Now that corporate tax rates are largely 
the same as individual rates, that is no longer the case. Some other major potential tax costs 
which may weigh against incorporation and in favor of partnership form include the repeal of 
the General Utilities3 doctrine in 1986, which now forces corporations to pay federal income 
taxes on the appreciation in property they distribute. Also, deductible costs, losses, and other 
tax-reducing items pass through a partnership and take effect, pro rata, in the partners' 
individual tax returns, where they can be of immediate benefit, something a corporation 
cannot offer. Finally, the corporation has lost its longtime tax advantage over the partnership 
in the area of pensions, and both now generally offer the same tax benefits as to retirement 
plans, although not for certain other less important employee fringe benefits. 
Although limited liability would seem to remain a major reason for favoring 
incorporation over partnership formation, essentially the same limited liability advantages can 
be gained through a limited partnership. Insulation against personal liability can be especially 
effective by using a corporation to act as the general partner of a limited partnership. Also, a 
relatively new form of organization, the "limited liability company," offers limited liability to 
its owners or members and also is usually subject to the Subchapter K tax regime - no double 
tax. Limited liability companies will be studied later, in Chapter 26. All you learn here about 
partnership taxation generally will apply to them.4 · 
C. PARTNERSHIP STATUS 
The first major inquiry is whether an entity organized as a partnership under local law 
stands up as such, or whether it has to be reclassified as another form of organization for 
federal income tax purposes. For federal income tax purposes all business or investment 
entities that are not sole proprietorships fall into one of the following basic classifications: 
corporation; trust or estate; or partnership. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 through 301.7701-4. Thus, for 
example, even the most obscure or novel foreign entity must be forced into one of these three 
pigeonholes for U.S. federal income tax purposes if it has to deal with the IRS. (There are 
some specialized entities, such as farmers' cooperatives that fall into unique categories, but 
only because Congress carved out special rules for them.) 
Conversely, many relationships that appear to involve no entity at all, such as landlord 
and tenant or debtor and creditor, have the potential for inadvertently producing a partnership 
for federal income tax purposes. 
General Utils. & Oper. Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 ( 1935). 
Some closely-held corporations are permitted to make a federal income tax election to be taxed as 
(Subchapter) S corporations. No separate corporate income tax applies to them, and they are taxed 
much like, but not the same as, Subchapter K partnerships. 
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The Supreme Court shaped the process of classifying entities for federal income tax 
purposes in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). The facts involved a trust that 
was organized to form and operate a golf course for a profit. The Court evaluated the question 
in terms of whether the trust more closely resembled a corporation or a traditional trust. 
Finding a preponderance of corporate characteristics, it declared the entity to be taxable as a 
corporation. 
In later years, physicians took advantage of the tendency of the case law to treat a 
state law limited partnership as a corporation if it had a "preponderance of corporate 
characteristics," thereby allowing them to get the benefit of the more generous pension plan 
arrangements formerly available only to corporations. The Treasury Department 
counterattacked with the so-called Kintner Regulations, named after the Kintner case, which 
strove to ensure that a limited partnership would be treated as a partnership and not as a 
corporation. Tax shelter promoters in turn latched onto the generously pro-limited partnership 
rules and marketed their wares as limited partnership interests, with deductions passing 
through to the limited partners. 
The Regulations required two preliminary factors to exist in order to find either a 
partnership or a corporation. They required that there be "associates" who joined together in 
order to conduct a profit-making enterprise, and that they did so with a view to sharing in 
those profits. There was an acknowledged possible exception for a one-shareholder 
corporation. 
Assuming those two factors existed, then the question became whether the enterprise 
had three or more of the following characteristics, in which event it was characterized as a 
corporation for federal income tax purposes: 
l. Continuity of life, meaning the entity does not legally dissolve if a member 
transfers an interest in the entity; 
2. Centralization of management, meaning that the power to make managerial 
decisions is concentrated in less than all the members; 
3. Free transferability of interests, meaning the owners can transfer their 
interests in income and capital of the enterprise; and 
4. Limited liability, meaning there is not even one owner who has unlimited 
liability for the obligations of the enterprise. 
Curiously, the government did not amend these Regulations during the tax shelter era. 
Instead, it took a litigating position that limited partnerships are generally taxable as 
corporations, as the Larson case (next) exemplifies. It was a failure. What follows is a heavily 
edited version of the Larson decision, which utterly defeated the government. The Kintner 
Regulations have recently been rewritten, and the four-factor analysis has been obliterated, but 
the concept of limited liability remains important under the new Regulations with respect to 
the default rules for foreign entities. Accordingly, the discussion of that concept in Larson 
remains important. 
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LARSON v. COMMISSIONER 
66 T.C. 159 (1976) 
[The taxpayers owned limited partnership interests in two real estate syndications 
(Mai Kai and Soumis) organized under the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act. The 
general partner in each partnership was a corporation (GHL) that was independent of the 
limited partners and was organized for the purpose of promoting and managing the 
syndications. Under California law the partnerships could be dissolved by the bankruptcy of 
the general partner. The general partner invested no money in the partnerships and held 
interests that were subordinated to those of the limited partners. The limited partners could 
vote to remove the general partner. The limited partners could transfer their income rights with 
the consent of the general partner, which consent could not unreasonably be withheld. A 
transferee of a limited partner's capital interest, if the transfer was at fair market value, had the 
right to become a substituted limited partner without the consent of any member. There were 
clearly "associates" and a "joint profit intent." There was centralized management; interests 
were found freely transferable on the facts; the entity did legally dissolve if a general partner 
went bankrupt. The remaining issue was whether the entity had the corporate characteristic of 
limited liability. The facts as to that point were that the general partner was a corporation with 
only modest assets and was owned by persons unrelated to the limited partners.] 
TANNENWALD, J. 
3. Limited Liability 
Unless some member is personally liable for debts of, and claims against, an entity ... 
the entity possesses the corporate characteristic of limited liability. The regulation provides 
that "in the case of a limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, personal liability exists with respect to each general partner, except 
as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph." The first sentence of subparagraph (2) 
establishes a conjunctive test, under which a general partner is considered not to have personal 
liability only "when he has no substantial assets (other than his interest in the partnership) 
which could be reached by a creditor of the organization and when he is merely a 'dummy' 
acting as the agent of the limited partners." In other words, personal liability exists if the 
general partner either has substantial assets or is not a dummy for the limited partners . .. 
Although the purpose of subparagraph (2) was ostensibly to delineate the conditions under 
which personal liability of a general partner does not exist, practically all the remaining 
material in the subparagraph outlines the conditions under which such personal liability does 
exist. In several examples, personal liability is said to exist, either because the general partner 
has substantial assets or because he is not a dummy for the limited partners .... In no instance 
is there a suggestion that both conditions established by the first sentence of subparagraph (2) 
need not be satisfied. 
In so concluding, we are mindful that in Glensder Textile Co., supra, the apparent 
source of the language in the Regulations, the term "dummy" was arguably considered 
applicable to any general partner without substantial assets risked in the business. The opinion 
in Glensder states: 
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"If, for instance, the general partners were not men with substantial assets risked 
in the business but were mere dummies without real means acting as the agents of the 
limited partners, whose investments made possible the business, there would be 
something approaching the corporate form of stockholders and directors .... " 
Thus, lack of substantial assets seems to be considered the equivalent of being a 
dummy - an equivalence which respondent apparently sought to avoid by using the word 
"and" in his existing Regulations. 
While it may be doubtful that GHL could be considered to have had substantial assets 
during the years in issue, we find it unnecessary to resolve this question since it is clear that 
GHL was not a dummy for the limited partners of Soumis and Mai-Kai. Respondent contends 
that GIL fell within the "dummy" concept because it was subject to removal by the limited 
partners, and thus was subject to their ultimate control. While it is true that a mere "dummy" 
would be totally under the control of the limited partners, it does not follow that the presence 
of some control by virtue of the power to remove necessarily makes the general partner a 
"dummy." It seems clear that the limited partners' rights to remove the general partner were 
designed to give the limited partners a measure of control over their investment without 
involving them in the "control of the business"; the rights were not designed to render GHL a 
mere dummy or to empower the limited partners "to direct the business actively through the 
general partners." Glensder Textile Co., 46 B.T.A. at 183. Moreover, the record indicates that 
the limited partners did not use GHL as a screen to conceal their own active involvement in 
the conduct of the business; far from being a rubber stamp, GHL was the moving force in 
these enterprises. With a minor exception, the persons controlling GHL were independent of 
and unrelated to the limited partners. 
In view of the foregoing we conclude that personal liability existed with respect to 
GHL, and the partnerships lack the corporate characteristic of limited liability. 
Our task herein is to apply the provisions of respondent's Regulations as we find them 
and not as we think they might or ought to have been written .... On this basis, petitioners 
must prevail. 
NOTES 
1. The IRS's next moves. In Rev. Ru!. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448, the Service accepted 
the outcome in Larson and in effect gave up the fight. Then, almost twenty years 
later, the IRS promulgated the "check-a-box" regulations (also commonly referred to 
as "check-the-box" regulations) that let taxpayers elect whether they want to treat 
unincorporated business entities as partnerships or corporations for federal income 
tax purposes. Reg. § 301.7701-1 through 3, effective as of the beginning of 1997. 
(True trusts cannot make the election.) Does this make Larson unimportant? Not 
entirely. Because the concept of "limited liability" in Larson is a key issue in 
determining whether to classify a foreign business entity as a corporation or as a 
partnership or sole proprietorship. The first appendix at the back of the book contains 
a flow chart distinguishing among sole proprietorships, partnerships, and 
corporations and the impact of the check-the-box election. In addition, a copy of 
Form 8832 (Entity Classification Election) is attached as an appendix at the end of 
the book. Reg.§ 301.7701-2(a) defines "business entity." 
2. But state law changed. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) is 
not the same as the UPA contemplated by the Larson court. See RULPA §§ 402, 801. 
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It became possible to have the partners agree that the partnership will continue 
despite the bankruptcy of a general partner by means of selecting a new general 
partner within a ninety-day window period. This makes partnerships less vulnerable 
to technical legal dissolutions. You will look at the impact of dissolutions later in the 
book. 
3. Trusts. Prior to the check-a-box regulations, if a trust had the power to conduct 
business, it was treated as a corporation. This was because, in addition to having a 
business purpose and associates (namely, the beneficiaries, the grantor, or both 
combined), centralized management, and limited liability, trusts commonly have free 
transferability and unlimited life; hence, they were generally doomed to corporate 
status if they had a business purpose. See Reg. § 301.7701-4(a). If a trust does not 
have a power to conduct business, it is simply a trust. Under the check-a-box system, 
if it does have a power to conduct business (and if it has "associates"), it becomes a 
"business entity," and it can elect whether to be taxed as a partnership or a 
corporation. See the Preamble to the Proposed Regulations, issued May 13, 1996. As 
a result, one can add a business power to a trust document (which would make it a 
corporation) and then elect to treat it as a partnership. 
4. Associates in a testamentary trust setting. Bedell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1207 
(1986), held that a testamentary trust that operated a bedding factory for profit was 
not to be treated as a corporation, on the theory that there were no "associates." The 
beneficiaries, who were heirs of the decedent, had no managerial authority and had 
no hand in forming the trust. The case may offer a blueprint for the wicked who 
would rather operate under the trust rules than the partnership rules. 
5. Liquidating trusts. There is another group of trusts that can qualify as trusts despite 
a business flavor. These consist of liquidating trusts, which are used temporarily to 
take control of the assets of a corporation that is in the process of being dismantled, 
and bondholders' protective trusts, which are vehicles by which bondholders take 
temporary claim to a debtor's assets pursuant to powers granted them by the terms of 
the debt instrument. As long as their primary purposes are not submerged by the 
conduct of business, bondholders' trusts and liquidating trusts can retain their income 
tax status as trusts, despite their possible profitability. Reg. § 301.7701-4(d). 
Likewise, investment trusts sold to the public and holding portfolios of income- 
producing assets can retain their status as long as their reinvestment powers are 
highly circumscribed. Reg. § 30I.7701-4( c ). These are commonly referred to as "unit 
investment trusts" and are frequently advertised in business sections of newspapers. 
6. Per se corporations. Regulations identify the following eight specific business 
organizations that each will be deemed a "per se corporation" for federal tax 
purposes: all statutory corporations; joint-stock companies; associations; insurance 
companies subject to Subchapter L; state-chartered banks that have deposits insured 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; state-owned entities; non-§ 770 I (a)(3) entities 
(e.g., publicly traded partnerships subject to § 7704); and specified foreign business 
entities (i.e., eighty different foreign entities designated by name). Reg. § 30I.7701- 
2(b ). 
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7. Grandfather rules. The check-a-box regulations generally apply only to entities 
formed on or after January 1, 1997. The regulations promise to respect the 
partnership classification of any domestic eligible entity that was in existence before 
1997 if three conditions are met: (i) the entity had a reasonable basis for partnership 
classification; (ii) the entity and all owners of the entity recognized the federal tax 
consequences of any change in the entity's classification after I 991; and (iii) neither 
the entity nor any member was notified by the IRS in writing on or before May 8, 
1996, that the entity's classification was under audit. Reg. § 301.7701-3(0(2). There 
was also limited grandfathering for foreign entities. 
8. Election and Default rules. If the entity is a business entity (and not a trust), then it 
may be a per se corporation. If it is not, then it falls into the residual group of 
business entities, which is the topic of the rest of this paragraph. (If the business 
enterprise existed before 1997, it is likely to be grandfathered.) Assuming it is not 
grandfathered, then the owners are free to make the check-a-box election. Let's 
assume they do not elect. What then? If it is a U.S. business entity, then the "default" 
outcome is that it is a sole proprietorship if there is only one owner and a partnership 
if there are several owners. Reg. § 30 I. 770 l-3(b )( l ). If it is foreign business entity 
and no one has personal liability, then the default result is that it is a corporation for 
federal income tax purposes; if at least one person has personal liability, then the 
enterprise is a sole proprietorship if there is only one owner and a partnership if there 
are several owners. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). An election must be made by all the 
owners, and may not be changed again for five years. 
9. State law and entity classification. Just because an entity achieves a particular 
status for federal income tax purposes does not mean that the same status will apply 
for state tax law purposes. For example, at least at one point the California Franchise 
Tax Board stated that it would not follow the check-a-box classification structure and 
would continue to rely on the Kintner four-factor test to determine whether an entity 
is a partnership for California state tax purposes. BNA Daily Tax Report, at G-8 
(Feb. 3, 1997); 18 Cal. Code Reg. § 23038. Likewise, Texas taxes limited liability 
companies under its franchise tax, regardless of whether they elect to be taxed as 
partnerships, and recently imposing the franchise tax on state law limited 
partnerships. Texas Tax Code Chapter 171. 
10. Partner? Even if an entity is a partnership, that does not determine whether everyone 
who is engaged in it is a partner. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-332, 1977-2 C.B. 484 (even 
though such arrangements are illegal under state law, a non-accountant may be 
treated as a member of an accounting partnership for federal income tax purposes). 
REV. RUL. 75-374 
1975-2 C.B. 261 
Advice has been requested whether, under the circumstance described below, the co- 
owners of an apartment project would be treated as a partnership for Federal income tax 
purposes. 
X, a life insurance company, and Y, a real estate investment trust, each own an 
undivided one-half interest in an apartment project. X and Y entered into a management 
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agreement with Z, an unrelated corporation, and retained it to manage, operate, maintain, and 
service the project. 
Generally, under the management agreement Z negotiates and executes leases for 
apartment units in the project; collects rents and other payments from tenants; pays taxes, 
assessments, and insurance premiums payable with respect to the project; performs all other 
services customarily performed in connection with the maintenance and repair of an apartment 
project; and performs certain additional services for the tenants beyond those customarily 
associated with maintenance and repair. Z is responsible for determining the time and manner 
of performing its obligations under the agreement and for the supervision of all persons 
performing services in connection with the carrying out of such obligations. 
Customary tenant services, such as heat, air conditioning, hot and cold water, 
unattended parking, normal repairs, trash removal, and cleaning of public areas are furnished 
at no additional charge above the basic rental payments. All costs incurred by Z in rendering 
these customary services are paid for by X and Y. As compensation for the customary services 
rendered by Z under the agreement, X and Y each pay Z a percentage of one-half of the gross 
rental receipts derived from the operation of the project. 
Additional services, such as attendant parking, cabanas, and gas, electricity, and other 
utilities are provided by Z to tenants for a separate charge. Z pays the costs incurred in 
providing the additional services, and retains the charges paid by tenants for its own use. 
These charges provide Z with adequate compensation for the rendition of these additional 
services. 
Section 761(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that the term 
"partnership" includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated 
organization through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is 
carried on, and which is not a corporation or a trust or estate. 
Section 1.761-l(a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that mere co-ownership of 
property that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute a 
partnership. Tenants in common may be partners if they actively carry on a trade, business, 
financial operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof. For example, a partnership exists 
if co-owners of an apartment building lease space and in addition provide services to the 
occupants either directly or through an agent. 
The furnishing of customary services in connection with the maintenance and repair 
of the apartment project will not render a co-ownership a partnership. However, the furnishing 
of additional services will render a co-ownership a partnership if the additional services are 
furnished directly by the co-owners or through their agent. In the instant case by reason of the 
contractual arrangement with Z, X and Y are not furnishing the additional services either 
directly or through an agent. Z is solely responsible for determining the time and manner of 
furnishing the services, bears all the expenses of providing these services, and retains for its 
own use all the income from these services. None of the profits arising from the rendition of 
these additional services are divided between X and Y. 
Accordingly, X and Y will be treated as co-owners and not as partners for purposes of 
section 761 of the Code. 
1. PARTNER IN A PARTNERSHIP OR A LENDER? 
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish common commercial relationships from 
partnerships for federal income tax purposes. The following early case deals with the knotty 
question of sorting a lending arrangement from a partnership. · 
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DORZBACK v. COLLISON 
195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952), aff'g 93 F. Supp. 935 (D. Del. 1950) 
MARIS, CIRCUIT JUDGE 
This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff taxpayer in an action brought in the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware for the recovery of income taxes and 
interest paid to the defendant Collector pursuant to deficiency assessments made by the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the years 1943, 1944 and 1945. 
The facts are these. On May 14, 194 I the taxpayer's wife loaned to the taxpayer from 
her own funds the sum of $8,500 to pay off an existing indebtedness of his in that amount and 
to evidence his resulting indebtedness to her the taxpayer gave her his bond in that amount 
bearing interest at 5% per annum. On January 4, 1943 the taxpayer and his wife entered into a 
written agreement in which they agreed that in lieu of the interest she had been receiving on 
this indebtedness she should share in the net profits derived from the taxpayer's retail business 
by receiving 25% of the net profits after the payment of an annual salary of $4,000 to the 
taxpayer. It was further agreed that the wife should continue to be a creditor and not a partner 
of the taxpayer but that her standing as a creditor should be subordinated to the rights of all 
general business creditors of the taxpayer. 
Under this agreement the taxpayer's wife received $6,892.33 for 1943, $7,681.63 for 
1944 and $10,346.32 for 1945. In computing their taxable net incomes for these years these 
amounts were reported as income by the wife and deducted by the taxpayer as interest paid. 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed taxpayer's interest deductions of 25% of 
net profits, allowing deductions only in the amount of 5% of the principal sum of $8,500. The 
present action was instituted to recover the deficiencies assessed and paid by reason of the 
disallowance of these deductions. 
At the trial, the district judge directed the jury to bring in a verdict for the taxpayer on 
the ground that there was no evidence of lack of a bona fide debtor creditor relationship 
between the taxpayer and his wife as a result of the agreement of January 4, 1943. The 
question whether or not the 25% share of net profits could legally be construed as a payment 
of interest was reserved and decided, as a matter of law, in favor of the taxpayer by the district 
judge. Alternatively, the district judge concluded that the taxpayer and his wife were joint 
adventurers and accordingly taxable on their respective shares in the profits of the business for 
the years involved. The defendant's motions for judgment n. o. v. and for a new trial were 
accordingly denied. D.C., 93 F. Supp. 935. This appeal followed. 
The defendant contends that the district judge erred in not submitting to the jury the 
question whether a debtor-creditor relationship existed between the taxpayer and his wife and 
in concluding that the payments made by the taxpayer to his wife in 1943, 1944 and I 945 
were deductible interest payments. 
Section 23(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that in computing net income 
there shall be allowed as a deduction "All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on 
indebtedness." The taxpayer contends that under the express terms of this section he is entitled 
to the whole of the deductions which he claimed. For, he says, he was indebted to his wife and 
the amounts he paid her were interest on that indebtedness. The defendant contends, on the 
other hand, that there was evidence from which the jury might have found that the 1943 
agreement did not create a debtor-creditor relationship but was merely a scheme to reallocate 
family income and that therefore the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct as interest the 
amounts paid his wife during 1943, 1944 and 1945. 
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The defendant points to the following facts to which the taxpayer testified: The year 
1942 had been fairly profitable for the taxpayer; the arrangement agreed upon would be 
advantageous to him in reporting his income; his wife desired a larger return on her money 
than 5%; he felt grateful to her because of the fact that in 1932, when his bank was pressing 
him for payment of his debt in the amount of $25,000, she had endorsed his note to provide 
additional security. The defendant urges that these circumstances surrounding the 1943 
agreement show the arrangement to be a device to reallocate income among the family group 
and therefore raised an issue as to the bona fides of the agreement and whether a bona fide 
debtor-creditor relationship resulted from it. The defendant, however, does not deny that prior 
to January 4, 1943 the taxpayer was unconditionally indebted to his wife in the amount of 
$8,500. Nor does he contend that the controlling state law does not recognize inter-spouse 
indebtedness. The agreement of January 4, 1943 expressly provided that the wife should 
continue to be a creditor of the taxpayer. We think that the evidence would support no other 
finding than that the indebtedness which resulted from the wife's loaning of her own money to 
her husband in 1941 continued after the agreement of 1943. 
We have not overlooked the principle that transactions between husband and wife 
calculated to reallocate family income or reduce family taxes are subject to careful scrutiny. 
But here, as we have pointed out, the wife had a personal stake of her own, the $8,500 of her 
own money which she had loaned the taxpayer, upon which she was entitled to a return. 
Indeed the defendant concedes this since the Commissioner allowed the deduction of interest 
at 5% for the years in question, a position clearly inconsistent with the denial of any debtor- 
creditor relationship. 
We think that the district judge rightly held that the agreement of 1943 did not change 
that relationship. For that agreement concerned only the return which the wife was to receive 
on her loan. It did not change her status as a creditor. Nor did it affect her relationship as a 
creditor when she agreed to subordinate her claim to the claims of the general business 
creditors. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 0.P.P. Holding Corp., 2 Cir., I 935, 76 F.2d 
11, 12. And even if the 1943 agreement had operated to change the wife's status from creditor 
to partner or joint adventurer the result, taxwise, would have been the same, as the district 
judge concluded. For in that situation the wife would still have been taxable on her 25% share 
of the profits of the business. We accordingly conclude that the district judge rightly held that 
the evidence established the existence of a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship between the 
taxpayer and his wife during the years in question. 
The other question to be determined is whether the taxpayer was entitled to deduct the 
payments made under the 1943 agreement "in lieu of interest" as interest payments under 
Section 23(b ). The defendant contends that the payments of 25% of net profits, which 
amounted almost to the amount of the principal in 1943 and 1944 and in 1945 were greater 
than the actual indebtedness, could not be considered to be interest under that section. He 
claims that it was error for the district judge to determine as a matter of law that payments of a 
share in the net profits of the business made in lieu of interest were deductible as interest 
payments. 
Interest on indebtedness has been defined to mean "compensation for the use or 
forbearance of money." Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940). The word must be 
given the "usual, ordinary and everyday meaning of the term." Old Colony R. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 1932(a), 284 U.S. 552, (a). In the Old Colony case the Supreme Court said 
[284 U.S. at page 560]: "And as respects 'interest,' the usual import of the term is the amount 
which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money. He who pays and he who 
receives payment of the stipulated amount conceives that the whole is interest." 
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The defendant contends that although Section 23(b) provides that "Al I interest paid" 
shall be deductible, yet when payments are made in lieu of interest at such high rates as are 
present in this case they are so unreasonable that they must be held not to be allowable interest 
deductions but rather a subterfuge to reallocate business profits. We are not, however, 
persuaded that a payment made "in lieu of interest" is not the equivalent of "interest." The 
phrase "in lieu of' means "instead of." Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., p. 
1427. In Kena, Inc., v. Commissioner, 1941, 44 B.T.A. 217, 219-220, 221, the Board of Tax 
Appeals said: 
It is axiomatic that the language used to describe a thing does not determine its 
character. The contract of December 13, 1932, denominated the amount to be paid to 
the petitioner as "an additional sum in lieu of interest." The word "lieu" means "place 
or stead." It does not imply that the character of the payment was different from 
interest but indicates that the method of computation was not in accord with the usual 
method of computing interest, the percentage of profit being employed as a 
substitute. The contract itself must be examined to determine whether the sum so 
designated was actual interest or was something else .... 
It is not essential that interest be computed at a stated rate, but only that a sum 
definitely ascertainable shall be paid for the use of borrowed money, pursuant to the 
agreement of the lender and borrower. 
Generally speaking, payments made for the use of money "in lieu of interest" are 
deductible as interest under Section 23(b ). 
Throughout the ages lenders have exacted all they could from borrowers for the use of 
money. How much has been exacted has depended upon the desperation of the borrower and 
the exigency of the moment. There is no requirement in Section 23(b) that deductible interest 
be ordinary and necessary or even that it be reasonable. Hence the phrase "All interest paid" 
contained in that section must be taken in its plain and literal meaning to include whatever 
sums the taxpayer has actually had to pay for the use of money which he has borrowed. Arthur 
R. Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 Cir., 1927, 23 F. 2d 833. We 
conclude that the district judge did not err in holding that the payments made by the taxpayer 
to his wife in 1943, 1944 and 1945 were interest paid on indebtedness and deductible under 
Section 23(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
NOTES 
1. Bifurcation of debt and equity. ln Farley Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 701 
(2d Cir. 1960), the court held that what the taxpayer claimed was "contingent interest," 
payable out of the appreciation in value of a building the taxpayer financed, was not 
interest at all, but instead reflected an equity (ownership) interest in the building. The 
court stopped short of declaring the arrangement a partnership, but it did deny interest 
expense deductions with respect to the equity component. The case is commonly seen as 
the first major pruning back of Dorzback v. Collison. 
2. The IRS's position on shared appreciation mortgages. Farley Realty is an early 
example of an effort to create a shared appreciation mortgage (SAM). Such mortgages 
became popular in the 1970s when interest rates and inflation were especially high and 
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lenders sought to share in the increases in property values caused by high rates of inflation 
that made lending money a more difficult business than in more stable times. In Rev. Rul. 
83-51, 1983-1 C.B. 48, the IRS stated that a borrower's obligation to pay the lender a 
portion of the increase in value of the taxpayer's principal residence constituted deductible 
interest under§ 163. The ruling is limited to the underlying situation, namely a fixed date 
for payment of both the contingent interest and the principal amount, a method for 
calculating the interest specified in the mortgage contract, an intent to create a debtor- 
creditor relationship, and payment that is made in cash or with funds borrowed from a 
different lender. The ruling is limited to residential loans, leaving commercial lenders in 
the dark as to the IRS's position on this important matter. 
3. Other relationships. There are numerous other arrangements that may produce a 
partnership for federal income tax purposes. For some nondefinitive definitions, see I.R.C. 
§§ 761(a), 6231. 6031(a), 7701(a)(2). It is difficult to generalize about the factors that will 
cause a court to characterize the arrangement one way or another, but one important factor 
to keep in mind is that there need not be a sharing of losses in order to classify a person as 
a member of a partnership. See McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974). One 
noteworthy case has suggested that even an attorney and his client can form a partnership 
for tax purposes. See Allum v. C.l.R., 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 74 (T.C. 2005), aff'd, 231 F.Appx. 
550 (9111 Cir. 2007). 
2. PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS 
In the late 1980s a number of major partnerships began trading on national stock 
exchanges. This novel trend was motivated by two events. One was the declining 
attractiveness of operating in the corporate form; the other was a trend in favor of combining 
tax shelter partnerships into larger enterprises. Congress became mildly alarmed at the 
potential revenue loss, and responded by including in the Revenue Act of 1987 a new § 7704, 
which treats certain publicly traded partnerships as corporations. As the name implies, a 
publicly traded partnership is any partnership whose interests are traded on an established 
securities market or readily tractable on a secondary market (or its equivalent). § 7704(b ). 
There is a major exception for partnerships at least 90% of whose income is from passive 
investment sources or from certain natural resource related activities, or from both combined. 
§ 7704(c). The exceptions are best explained as lobbying triumphs. 
The 1997 Act softened the rules for pre-existing publicly traded partnerships by 
enacting one of the few income taxes on gross income. Specifically, a publicly traded 
partnership in existence in 1997 could elect to be subject to a tax on gross income from the 
active conduct of a trade or business. If it elects, then the rule of present law treating a 
publicly traded partnership as a traditional corporation does not apply. The tax is 3.5% of the 
partnership's gross income from the active conduct of a trade or business. This could be a 
bargain for older publicly traded partnerships with high profit margins. § 7704(g). 
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PROBLEM 1-1 
Which of the following arrangements constitute a partnership for federal income tax purposes? 
1) Harry and Igor jointly own a warehouse, which they lease to the Acme Brick Company. 
They provide no services aside from paying the taxes and maintaining the warehouse. 
They share the revenues and expenses. See Reg.§ 301.7701-l(a)(2). 
2) Would the result differ if Harry and Igor drafted a contract to reflect this arrangement and 
declared in that document that it was a partnership agreement? 
3) They also jointly own the H&l Hotel and share the profits and losses 50:50. The hotel has 
the usual guest services. 
4) Same as 3) immediately above, but Igor shares in profits, but not in losses. 
6) Allie and her friend from architecture school days, Sally, occupy office space that they 
rent. Each has her own clients and each bills separately, but they share the cost of a 
secretary, furniture, equipment, supplies and mailing (which are all their costs). Are they 
partners in a business partnership? 
5) Allie recently lent the H&l hotel business $100,000 dollars for five years. Her return is 
based on 5% per year plus 10% of the hotel's net profits. Is Allie a partner? 
7) Allie left architecture and became a sharecropper, using the owner's land to plant wheat 
and paying for the right to plant on the land with 10% harvests. Is this sharecropping 
arrangement a partnership for federal income tax purposes? 
8) Allie could not stand sharecropping anymore. She left and became an associate at the 
Very Big Architecture Firm, which is a partnership for federal income tax purposes. It 
pays her a good salary plus a "bonus" equal to I 0% of her billings every year. Is Allie a 
partner of Very Big Architecture Firm for federal income tax purposes? 
9) Which of the following entities is a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation for 
federal income tax purposes? 
a) A "Berhad", organized in Malaysia. See Reg.§ 301.7701-2(b)(8). 
b) Bob, a U.S. citizen residing in Tulsa, signs an Oklahoma limited partnership 
agreement with the Berhad, known as Bob-Berhad Partners, Ltd. The partnership 
agreement is properly filed pursuant to Oklahoma law. Bob is the limited partner, 
and the Berhad is the general partner. 
i) The partners elect to treat the entity as a corporation, filing a Form 8832 on 
time. See Reg.§ 301.7701-3(a). 
ii) The partners make no election. See Reg.§ 301.7701-3(b). 
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iii) Instead, the Berhad and Bob contribute the same assets to a Delaware 
corporation. Can the corporation be electively rendered a partnership for 
federal income tax purposes? See Reg. § 301. 770 I-2(b ). 
c) Bob contributes his partnership interest in Bob-Berhad Partners, Ltd. to an 
irrevocable trust (not a grantor trust under §§ 671-679) formed pursuant to 
California law. 
i) The trust will hold the limited partnership interest and will distribute the 
earnings of the limited partnership to Bob. See Reg.§ 301.7701-2(a). 
ii) Same as "(i)", but the trust is empowered to and does conduct business. See 
Id. and Reg.§ 301.7701-4. 
iii) Same as "(ii)," but the trust elects to be taxed as a corporation. See Reg. 
§ 301.7701-3(b). 
iv) Same as "(i)", but the trust is revocable at will. 
d) For many years Bob has run a cigar store as a sole proprietor. On the advice of his 
lawyer, he contributes the assets of the store to a limited liability company 
("LLC"), which assures him he has no personal liability beyond what he 
contributes to the LLC. Can the LLC elect to be treated as: 
i) A corporation? See Reg.§§ 301.7701-I(a)(4) and 301.7701-2(a). 
ii) A partnership? See Reg.§ 301.7701-2(a). 
iii) Sole proprietorship? Id. 
iv) Assume that Bob transfers the assets to a Ruritanian LLC (a foreign 
limited liability company), which assures him limited liability. He makes 
no tax elections of any sort. See Reg. § 30 I. 770 I-3(b ). He is the sole 
owner of the LLC. 
v) Same as iv). Can the Ruritanain LLC elect to be taxed as a partnership or 
sole proprietorship? See Reg.§ 301.7701-3(a). 
e) Bob has capitalized brilliantly on the cigar craze and has recently admitted 
thousands of customers as partners. The partnership trades on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Is it a partnership or something else? How is it taxed? See 
§ 7704 and Reg. § 30 I. 770 l-2(b )(7). 
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3. ELECTION AGAINST PARTNERSHIP ST A TUS 
Read§ 761(a) and Reg.§ l.761-2(a)-(b). 
Section 761 (a) and the Regulations thereunder allow a partnership that is teetering on 
the brink of being a mere collection of individuals to elect out of Subchapter K, hence 
eliminating partnership status for purposes of that part of the Code. The statute identifies three 
situations in which this can be done: (I) where the entity operates solely as an investment 
vehicle, (2) where it operates solely for the joint extraction or joint use of property, or (3) 
where securities dealers join forces to engage in a particular underwriting transaction. 
The first and third cases are easy to understand. The second case is designed to assist 
passive co-owners of oil, gas or mineral properties who depend on an active operating 
company for their revenues. This avoids the need to file partnership tax returns and permits 
the co-owners to make specialized individual elections. For example, electing out of 
partnership status may allow a partner to make an otherwise impermissible like-kind exchange 
of partnership interests. The congressional quid pro quo is that in all cases it must be possible 
to calculate each member's individual tax liability without the need to compute "partnership 
taxable income." Conversely, it is possible for an enterprise that is a partnership for tax 
purposes to be a co-ownership arrangement for state law purposes. Such entities are known as 
"tax partnerships," as the next case illustrates. 
SCOTT, JUDGE 
MADISON GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. COMMISSIONER 
72 T.C. 521 (1979), ajf'd633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980) 
[The taxpayer is a regulated public utility that entered into a cooperative effort to 
build a nuclear power plant and to share the plant's output among its three principals. There 
was no agreement to share profits, only to take a share of the electric output.] 
The second issue in this case involves deductions claimed by petitioner as ordinary 
and necessary business expenses under section 162(a) for certain training costs and other 
expenses paid in connection with its interest in Plant 2, the nuclear power plant. 
Petitioner takes the position that the amounts paid in connection with its interest in the 
nuclear power plant for which it claims a deduction meet all the requirements of section 
162(a) for deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses and are not capital 
expenditures within the meaning of section 263. Petitioner argues that these expenses were 
incurred in carrying on its trade or business and were not "start-up costs of a new business." 
Petitioner's primary position is that its agreement of joint ownership of its nuclear plant with 
WPS and WPL does not create a partnership and that even if it does the expenses which it paid 
are ordinary and necessary business expenses of the partnership. 
Respondent takes the position that although the expenses which petitioner seeks to 
deduct would be ordinary and necessary expenses in its production of electricity if the 
construction of the nuclear plant were solely for use in its own business, these expenses are 
not deductible since they were incurred as pre-operating expenses of a partnership formed 
through petitioner's agreement with WPS and WPL. ... 
Thus, the determination of whether expenses are related to an existing trade or 
'business of the taxpayer is essential. Although the taxpayer may actively be engaged in a 
trade or business, the start-up costs or pre-operating expenses of another activity, not a part of 
such trade or business are not deductible under section 162(a) as they are not incurred in the 
carrying on of a trade or business. 
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It initially appears that all additional expenses involved in the present case were 
expended in the conduct of Petitioner's existing trade or business, the production of electricity. 
Although the means of production in the case of the nuclear facility may be radically different 
from conventional methods, the end product, electricity, is the same. 
However, closer analysis reveals that all additional expenses claimed are in fact 
incurred in the initial activity of the partnership formed through Petitioner's agreement with 
WPS and WPL. 
Respondent argues that the fact that the partners have elected under section 761 (a) of 
the Code and section 1.761-l(a) (2), Income Tax Regs., for the partnership to be excluded 
from the application of Subchapter K of the Code is an admission that petitioner's 
arrangement with WPS and WPL is a partnership. Respondent argues that irrespective of this 
election the agreement and relationship between petitioner, WPS and WPL creates a 
partnership within the meaning of section 770 I (a)(2). Respondent contends that the expenses 
which petitioner claims to be deductible are start-up costs which must be capitalized and not 
[current] expenses, relying primarily on Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, supra. 
The question on which the parties initially join issue is whether the arrangement 
between petitioner, WPS and WPL creates a partnership as defined in section 7701. While we 
agree with petitioner that the fact that the partners elected under section 76l(a) not to be 
subject to the provisions of Subchapter K is not an admission that the arrangement is a 
partnership, the definition of partnership contained in sections 761(a) and 7701 (a) (2) are the 
same.5 It is therefore necessary for us to decide whether the arrangement between petitioner, 
WPS and WPL is a partnership as defined by section 770 I (a)(2). 
While petitioner denies that filing an election out under section 76l(a) is an admission 
that a partnership exists for tax purposes, it does not contend that because of this election 
under section 761 (a) no partnership exists for the purposes of determining what constitutes 
deductible expenses under section 162. 
The clear import of petitioner's brief is that if we conclude that its arrangement with 
WPS and WLP is a partnership as defined in section 7701, then the deductibility of the 
expenses here involved is dependent upon whether those expenses are deductible by the 
partnership. Respondent makes no argument with respect to the election-out of the partnership 
under section 761 (a) but merely cites his Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30. Respondent does 
not cite or discuss Bryant v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 848. (1966), aff'd. 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 
1968), although in that case we in effect approved Rev. Rul. 65-118, supra, specifically 
pointing to the definition of partnership in section 7701(a)(2) "when used in this title" and the 
fact that section 48(c)(2)(D) (involved in the Bryant case and the revenue ruling) contained a 
specific provision with respect to limitations in the case of a partnership. We have found no 
case dealing with an election-out under section 761 (a) when the controlling statute outside of 
Subchapter K makes no reference to partnerships. In texts on partnerships we have found 
Respondent in Rev. Rul 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569, concludes that a venture formed by four electrical 
power companies substantially similar to the arrangement here of petitioner, WPS and WPL is 
properly classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes. The ruling then proceeds to discuss the 
provision of section 761 (a) and concludes that the members of the venture may elect under section 
761 (a) to have the venture excluded from the application of Subchapter K. The parties stipulated in 
this case that it was the intention of the co-tenants - petitioner, WPS and WPL - that they created 
only a co-tenancy and not a partnership and that they be taxed as co-tenants and not partners. This 
stipulation is followed by the stipulated statement: To that end WPS filed a federal partnership return, 
Form 1065, and an election out of the provision ofSubchapter K of the [Code]. 
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statements which indicate that an election-out in such a situation is not controlled by the 
Bryant decision and other indications in the same text that it is .... 
Since petitioner here makes no contention that an election-out under section 761 (a) 
causes the unincorporated group not to be a partnership except for purposes of those statutes 
which contain a specific reference to "partnerships," we have not considered and do not here 
decide such a possible issue even though a question in this respect is raised by writers of texts 
on partnerships and a number of law review articles dealing with partnership problems. 
It is petitioner's position that a profit motive of the partnership as an entity is a 
requirement of partnership status and that such a motive is lacking from the arrangement 
present in this case. Petitioner argues that only a co-ownership and expense-sharing 
arrangement was created from its agreement with WPS and WPL. 
Petitioner notes that section 1.761-l(a), Income Tax Regs., and section 301.7701-3(a), 
Proced. & Admin. Regs., provide that "a joint undertaking merely to share expense is not a 
partnership" and that mere co-ownership of property is not a partnership. Petitioner also points 
out that these regulations provide that "Tenants in common, however, may be partners if they 
actively carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the profits 
thereof." Petitioner relies, in support of its position of the necessity of a profit motive by the 
entity for partnership status, on Cooperative Power Plant v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 1143 
( 1940), and Co-operative Insurance v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 1151 ( 1940), in which 
arrangements somewhat similar to those in the instant case were held not to be associations 
taxable as corporations because gain was not an objective of the arrangement. In our view, 
these cases have no bearing on whether the arrangement here involved created a partnership 
under the definition of section 770 I (a)(2). 
In addition, petitioner cites Wisconsin State Jaw to support his view that the 
arrangement in this case is not a partnership. It is clear, however, that state law is in no way 
controlling on the question of whether an unincorporated activity is a partnership for Federal 
tax purposes. Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077 (1964). 
Petitioner argues that respondent's Rev. Rut. 68-344, I 968- I C.B. 569, is erroneous in 
concluding that an arrangement similar to the one here is a partnership. The essence of 
petitioner's argument is that the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant in this 
case is equivalent to a joint undertaking to share expenses such as that described in the 
regulations and therefore does not constitute a partnership. Section 1.761-l(a) and section 
301.7701-3(a), Income Tax Regs., declare that "if two or more persons jointly construct a 
ditch merely to drain surface water from their properties, they, are not partners." In our view, 
petitioner's arrangement with WPS and WPL is in no way comparable to the joint 
construction of a drainage ditch. 
Prior to 1954, the following definition of a partnership for Federal tax purposes was 
found in section 3797(a)(2), I.R.C. I 939: 
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(2) Partnership and Partner. The term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group, 
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of 
which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, 
within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and the term 
"partner" includes a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or 
• . 6 organization .... 
As petitioner points out, it has long been recognized that mere co-ownership of 
property will not create a partnership. Estate of Appleby v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 18 
(1940). In that case co-owners of inherited property, at the suggestion of automotive dealers, 
erected a garage on the property and rented the space to defray the expenses of owning the 
inherited property, primarily real estate taxes. We held that the erection and renting of the 
garage was not a group, joint venture or other organization within the partnership definition of 
the 1939 Code. Whether co-ownership of property gives rise to a partnership for Federal tax 
purposes is determined by "the degree of business activities of the co-owners or their agents .. 
. . "See Hahn v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 212 (1954), which held the requisite activities not to 
be present. The regulations set forth this test in slightly different words and it is the wording of 
the regulations as interpreted by petitioner, which it would have us follow in equating the con- 
struction of a drainage ditch with the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. 
Section 1.761-l(a), Income Tax Regs., and section 301.7701-3(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs., as 
noted above, declare that "Tenants in common, however, may be partners if they actively 
carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof." 
Petitioner, relying on this regulation, contends that a partnership must have a profit motive for 
the partnership entity and that, because petitioner received the electricity from the nuclear 
power plant in kind, such a profit motive did not exist in its arrangement with WPL and WPS. 
We do not agree. 
First, the statute does not require a profit motive; rather it merely requires "an 
unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, 
or venture is carried on ... " The business activity or profit motive test is important in 
distinguishing partnerships from the mere co-ownership of property. However, this test is not 
the only test for what constitutes a partnership for Federal tax purposes. Second, the test of 
business activity or profit motive for purposes of finding a Federal tax partnership is clearly 
met in the situation at hand where a group of business organizations decide to band together to 
produce with economies of scale a common product to be distributed to the members of the 
venture in kind. In Bentex Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 565, 571 (1953), we found 
without any extended discussion that an organization formed to extract oil under an operating 
agreement which called for distribution of the oil in kind was a partnership for Federal tax 
purposes. The agreement in the Bentex case was analogous to the agreement in the instant 
case. That an agreement such as the one here under consideration creates a partnership is 
implicit in the holdings in Cooperative Power Plant, supra, and Cooperative Insurance, supra 
... Joint construction of a drainage ditch simply does not require the business activity or 
6 
The definition was first placed in the Code by sec. 1111 (a)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1932. The 
purpose of this provision was to broaden the Federal partnership definitions to include therein a 
number of arrangements that under state law were not partnerships, such as joint ventures. See S. 
Rep. No. 665, 72nd Cong., I 51 Sess. ( 1932), 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 496, 538. In the I 954 Code, this 
definition of partnership was unchanged and is contained in the following two sections: section 
761 (a) and section 770 I (a)(2). 
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contain the profit motive found in the joint extraction of oil or the joint production of 
electricity by a nuclear power plant. 
Following the Cooperative cases and the Bentex case, Congress reenacted the 
definition of partnership in the 1954 Code. In addition to carrying the definition forward in 
section 7701 (a)(2) without change, Congress also placed the definition within Subchapter K, 
section 761 (a), with the added caveat allowing certain organizations to elect to be excluded 
from the application of Subchapter K. Section 761 (a) reads as follows: 
(a) Partnership. For purposes of this subtitle, the term "partnership" includes a 
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by 
means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, 
within the meaning of this title, a corporation or a trust or estate. Under regulations the 
Secretary may, at the election of all the members of an unincorporated organization, exclude 
such organization from the application of all or part of this Subchapter, if it is availed 
(I) for investment purposes only and not for the active conduct of a business, or 
(2) for the joint production, extraction, or use of property, but not for the purpose of 
selling services or property produced or extracted, if the income of the members 
of the organization may be adequately determined without the computation of 
partnership taxable income. 
If distribution in kind of jointly produced property was enough to avoid partnership 
status, we do not see how such distribution could be used as a test for allowing an election to 
be excluded from the partnership provisions of Subchapter K. Although there is no discussion 
of the reason for the "election-out" provision of section 761 (a) in the legislative history of the 
section, it has been generally considered that this provision was enacted as Congressional 
approval of the Bentex case coupled with a recognition of the hardships caused by that 
decision.7 
In sum, we hold that petitioner's arrangement with WPS and WPL was an 
unincorporated organization carrying on a business, financial operation or venture. To the 
extent a profit motive may be required for an unincorporated organization to be a partnership 
for Federal tax purposes, we hold that it is present in this case with the in kind distribution of 
electricity produced by the nuclear power plant. 
NOTES 
1. IRS position. The IRS continues to believe that joint production for separate sale is the 
same as "joint profit." See Flower & Holbrook, Partners and Co-owners: The Use of 
Undivided Interests in Equipment Leasing, 41 Tax Law. 733 (1988). Naturally, this 
conclusion has no bearing on whether there is a partnership for state law purposes. 
7 Thus, Congress afforded such organizations an election to be excluded from the provrsions of 
Subchapter K. Petitioner makes some interesting arguments as to the policy reasons for not penalizing 
it because economies of scale have forced it to combine forces with other utilities to enjoy the 
advantages of nuclear power. These arguments, however, are misplaced with respect to the question 
of the definition of a partnership. Instead, they should have been addressed with respect to the effect 
of the sec. 761 (a) election to be excluded from the application of Subchapter K .... 
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2. The "tax partnership." Note that the product of the Madison Gas case is a so-called tax 
partnership, an entity that is a co-ownership at state law, but a partnership for federal 
income tax purposes. These are common in the oil patch, where they are used in 
connection with joint oil and gas operating agreements. The advantages are: no need to 
negotiate a partnership agreement; a simple (often one page) agreement as to allocations; 
ability of each owner to encumber his or her own interest (as opposed to the difficult 
process of encumbering a partnership interest); and no participant with unlimited liability. 
If the partnership in Madison Gas had managed to elect out of Subchapter K, it would 
then have been a co-ownership for federal income tax purposes as well. 
3. Expense sharing. What if the taxpayer's deal with the other two utilities had merely 
involved sharing expenses for maintaining a common facility? Clearly, there would be no 
partnership because there would be no sharing of revenues in cash or in kind. Reg. 
§ 30 l. 770 l-3(a). What if they shared revenues from a commonly-owned rental property? 
Now it is getting more difficult. However, the same regulation tells us that there is still no 
partnership, but that if the co-owners provide significant services to the tenants in 
connection with renting the property, there is a partnership. Id. 
4. Failure to file by small partnerships. Small partnerships often fail to file their federal 
income tax forms. Section 6698 of the Code imposes a $50 per partner penalty on failure 
to file a partnership return, but contains a built-in loophole in that it excuses the penalty if 
there is reasonable cause for nonfiling, and Rev. Proc. 84-35, 1984-1 C.B. 509 presumes 
the existence of reasonable cause if the miscreant is a domestic partnership with not over 
ten partners, all of whom are U.S. individuals (or their estates) who have adequately 
reported their shares of the partnership's profits or losses, and each partner reported a 
simple pro-rata share of each item of partnership income, deduction, and so forth. That 
probably wipes thousands of simple partnership returns off the tax rolls. 
5. Lack of coordination with Subchapter K. The entity-aggregate distinction can be a 
serious problem when partnership tax issues overlap with non-partnership tax law 
questions. The explanation is fairly simple. Congress does not always consider the impact 
~ on the partnership rules when a new tax provision is added or an old one is tampered with. 
Indeed, it may take years for the lack of coordination between the partnership tax law and 
some other part of the tax law to show up. In general, it is usually best to apply the 
aggregate approach to partnerships outside of Subchapter K unless there are strong policy 
reasons not to do so. 
6. The lack of coordination between Subchapter Kand the rest of the Code is chronic. 
To take just a few simple examples, under§ 453A there is an interest charge when a non- 
dealer sells property on the installment obligation for a price exceeding $150,000 if the 
seller also has total installment obligations outstanding at year end in excess of $5 million. 
§ 453A(b )( 1 )-(2). The IRS asserts that the $5 million threshold is applied at the partner 
level. Notice 88-81, 1988-2 C.B. 397. By contrast under§ 179(d)(8), annual expensing of 
$250,000 (for 2008) under § 179 is explicitly limited at both the partner and partnership 
levels. (Here, the IRS does not have to assert; it knows.) Thus, if a ten-person equal 
partnership had $40,000 of§ 179 expenses, the partners would each report only $4,000. 
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4. RETROACTIVE AMENDMENTS OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
The partnership agreement generally controls the tax incidents associated with being a 
partner, but what if the agreement is amended? Can the amendment have retroactive force? 
Perhaps surprisingly,§ 76l(c) declares that the controlling agreement can be amended as late 
as the prescribed filing date for the entity's federal tax return (March 15 for a calendar year 
partnership), as long as the amendment is valid under local law. This means that the partners 
can wait up to the filing date to modify the agreement and, subject to some limits to be 
discussed later in this book, have the modifications stick for the year reported on the tax 
return. Reg. § 1. 761-1 ( c ). However, extensions of time granted to extend the filing date cannot 
extend the mandatory cut-off date for amending the partnership agreement. 
D. IRS AUDITS 
Prior to the enactment of §§ 6221-6232 in 1982, partnerships posed serious 
examination and collection problems for the IRS because the Service had to investigate and 
dispose of the liabilities of the partners one-by-one. Nowadays, they are disposed of as a 
group, except for partnerships with ten or fewer partners. 
There are three key features to the new system. The first is that each partnership that is 
subject to "unified audit proceedings" must have a so-called "tax matters partner." That is the 
general partner identified in the partnership agreement, or if no partner is designated, then the 
partner with the largest profits interest. § 6231 (a)(7). The tax matters partner faces off against 
the IRS in the audit process. The second key feature is the opportunity for minority partners 
who collectively have at least 5% of the profits to gang up and form their own group, which 
becomes a separate force in dealing with the audit. § 6223(b). The third factor is that each 
partner is obligated to report items that appear on the partnership return consistently on their 
personal returns, or else notify the IRS of the inconsistency. § 6222. The details are ornate. 
This is only a thumbnail sketch. 
IRS audit adjustments flow through to each partner, because the partnership is just a 
reporting entity and does not incur federal income tax liabilities. 
PROBLEM 1-2 
Travis H. Harbaugh and his family own a productive oil and gas property operated by 
an unrelated oil company. The family elects out of partnership status under§ 761(a) and Reg. 
§ l.761-2(b). The family members own the property as tenants-in-common, and they are 
legally free to dispose of their individual interests. Absent the election out, the Harbaugh 
family's arrangement is a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Travis is the 60% 
partner/owner, and each of his other family members has 10% of the oil-producing property. 
a) Can each owner use his or her own tax year (i.e., a calendar year) to report 
the profits or losses from the property regardless of the tax year used by the 
partnership (i.e., suppose that the partnership uses a fiscal year)? See 
§ 706(b)(1 )(A). 
b) Prior to the election out, does the Harbaugh family's arrangement constitute 
a "tax partnership"? 
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c) Can Travis engage in a tax-free exchange of his interest in the real estate under 
§ 1031? 
d) In Rev. Rul. 58-465, 1958-2 C.B. 376, the IRS ruled that an election out could 
not affect the limitation found in§ 704(d). Is the ruling still viable? 
e) Assume there is no election out and that in year 2 the family decides it wants to 
alter the partnership agreement. Assuming the partnership uses a calendar year 
tax year, must the amendment be made by March 15, the usual latest filing date 
for filing its partnership return, or can it be amended after that? See Reg. § I. 76 l- 
2(b ). 
f) Assuming there is no "election out" and there is no provision for a specific tax 
matters partner, is Travis the tax matters partner by default? 
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